Abstract-Currently, demand response resources can sell load reductions in wholesale energy markets. However, paying for load reductions ultimately results in an unbalanced market, where the amount of resources sold (megawatts) is less than the amount of resources bought (megawatts and "negawatts"). To resolve this imbalance, the ISO must allocate the cost of compensating demand response to those buyers who benefit from reduced LMPs. Current cost allocation methods are quite broad and based on each energy buyer's share of the total load. In an uncongested network, this results in a "fair" allocation of costs, i.e., an allocation proportional to the benefits that each party accrues. However, in a congested network, this is no longer the case, as price separation occurs between nodes. In this paper, we therefore propose a cost allocation method based on LMP sensitivity that accounts for the effect of congestion on the distribution of benefits between nodes with different LMPs. Since this sensitivity-based method only takes into account the cost allocation per node, we also propose a means of allocating costs between individual load serving entities (LSEs) at a single node. Due to this refinement, LSEs are rewarded according to their individual contribution to demand response. Finally, we define a fairness index to evaluate the performance of the proposed method as compared to a load-based allocation. We find that when load reductions are small (1%-3% total load), the fairness index of the proposed method is very close to zero, indicating almost identical benefit to cost ratios for all market participants. Although the fairness index increases with increasing load reductions, results show that even for larger load reductions, the fairness index is still lower for the proposed method than for the load-based allocation method.
I. INTRODUCTION
C URRENTLY, demand response resources can participate in wholesale markets for energy, capacity and ancillary services. During the mid-2000s, the Department of Energy funded several studies to quantify the benefits of demand response and provide recommendations for achieving them [1] . Several of these studies indicated that the economic benefits of demand response would be greater if various regulatory, technological and market barriers were removed [2] , [3] . In T. W. Haring is with the Power Systems Laboratory, ETH, Zurich 8092, Switzerland (e-mail: tharing@eeh.ee.ethz.ch).
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response to these findings, several ISOs established a number of incentive-based demand response programs [4] . Under these programs, demand response resources receive an incentive payment if they can reduce load during times of high energy prices. The goals of these wholesale demand response programs were to reduce overall costs and also to increase reliability.
While there is no denying the economic benefits of demand response, there are two undesirable consequences that are a direct result of paying for load reductions in wholesale energy markets. First, when a demand response resource curtails, the ISO experiences a reduction in revenue, a phenomenon known as "the billing unit effect". Since the ISO must compensate both generators and demand response providers for the resources that clear the energy market, the difference between market revenue and payouts is negative. This "missing money" is illustrated by the region shaded in red in Fig. 1 .
This negative balance represents money owed to demand response resources and must be addressed through cost allocation. Second, because of this out of market cost allocation requirement, an additional mechanism must be in place to prevent uneconomic purchases of demand response. Several ISOs have addressed this issue by only allowing economic demand response when LMPs are above a particular threshold [5] - [7] . In this paper, we focus on the issue of cost allocation and the challenge of maintaining a fair allocation of cost during times of congestion, when the benefits of DR vary significantly with location. We define a "fair" allocation process as one in which costs are allocated proportionally to benefits, and all energy buyers have an equal benefit to cost ratio. Several methods of cost allocation have been proposed, including assignment of costs 1) to the LSE associated with the DR provider, 2) to all purchasing customers, 3) in part to the LSE and in part broadly to all customers, 4) to retail customers that bid demand response into the wholesale market, and 5) in a settlement method that incorporates the cost of DR into the dispatch algorithm [8] , [9] . Although some ISOs have allocated the cost of DR to the host LSE, DR actually provides market-wide benefits. This market benefit is defined as the reduction in LMP due to the load reductions multiplied by the energy purchased. Thus, a more just and fair methodology would spread the cost across all beneficiaries of DR benefits. In this paper, we consider the case of those ISOs that allocate the cost of acquiring load reductions to those who would benefit from price reductions during demand response dispatch. Several of these said ISOs allocate DR costs based on each energy buyer's share of the total load. However, transmission constraints cause locational price differences and thus the price reductions induced by DR will depend on the location. During times when there is no congestion, and therefore no price separation, market participants benefit from reduced prices proportionally to their load shares. However, when there are binding constraints, an individual market participant's share of the overall benefit of DR is no longer a function of its share of the load. We therefore propose the use of LMP sensitivities to weight the load share and to reflect the impact of congestion on benefit distribution at the nodal level. Next, we propose a method to allocate the nodal DR costs between individual LSEs serving consumers at that node. The main contributions of this paper are a) the development of a cost allocation method that considers the effect of congestion on costs and benefits as well as the contribution of individual LSEs to demand response and b) a metric to evaluate the fairness of demand response cost allocation schemes.
In the following sections, we first present a historical overview of DR compensation in wholesale energy markets (Section II) then introduce current cost allocation methodologies for congestion-free hours, where the ISO establishes a single system-wide LMP as well as hours of congestion, where geographic price separation occurs and has a location-dependent effect on the benefits of demand response (Section III). In Section IV, we describe the proposed LMP-sensitivity based cost allocation scheme and fairness index. In Section V, we compare the performance of the proposed cost allocation method with the commonly used allocation scheme based on the load share.
II. EVOLUTION OF WHOLESALE DR COMPENSATION
In 2011 the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued a ruling, Order 745, requiring ISOs to pay economic demand response resources that participate in wholesale energy markets full LMP and to allocate that cost to all who benefit from the LMP reductions caused by said demand response resources [8] . Economists harshly criticized the economic efficiency of Order 745 [10] , [11] and eventually, that ruling was overturned in May of 2014 [12], [13] . However, even before this ruling, several ISOs voluntarily paid LMP for load reductions and dealt with cost allocation in various ways. In order to develop improved cost allocation methodologies, it is important to first consider how LMP payments to DR and the associated allocation of that cost have been done in the past.
From 2006 to 2007, PJM paid full LMP to demand response when the LMP was above $75/MWh and paid LMP minus generation and transmission charges (LMP-G&T) when the LMP was below $75/MWh. This period is known as the "incentive period", as DR was, at times of high LMPs, provided an additional incentive equal to generation and transmission charges. From 2007 until the issue of Order 745, the incentive was dropped, and demand response was paid LMP-G&T [5] at all times. During the incentive period as well as the LMP-G&T period, the cost of acquiring demand response cleared in the market was allocated solely to the load serving entity (LSE) responsible for serving the demand response provider [2] .
ISO-NE's early demand response programs limited participation to times of high real time prices (100$/MWh). However, the load reductions were voluntary and thus never cleared the real time market. Costs from DR payments were allocated to loads on a pro-rata basis as an out of market charge. From June 2005 until the issue of Order 745, ISO-NE expanded its program to allow DR to participate in the day-ahead market after the day-ahead market had cleared. Demand response offers with a price smaller than the day-ahead clearing price were accepted. DR thus had no effect on the day-ahead prices but could have an impact on the real time prices [6] . Day-ahead DR compensation was also allocated to loads on a pro-rata basis.
Up until the issue of Order 745, NYISO allowed demand response to submit bids in the day-ahead energy market when LMP was above a minimum threshold. That minimum varied from $50/MWh to $75/MWh. The minimum value was imposed primarily to prevent "free riding," or bidding load reduction that would have occurred regardless of the market clearing process and to assure that the load reduction would in fact be cost effective. Resources that cleared in the day-ahead market were paid the full market clearing price [7] .
This brief historical overview shows that DR compensation has varied significantly across ISOs. Regardless of the price paid for DR resources, those payments must inevitably be addressed through cost allocation.
III. CURRENT COST ALLOCATION METHODS

A. PJM and ISO-NE Method (Load-Based),
In the PJM energy market, demand response costs are allocated to all market participants with real-time exports from PJM and to load serving entities (LSEs) within zones where the LMP is greater than the net benefits threshold price. The cost allocation factor, , of the th LSE (or market participant with real-time exports) is based on its share of the total load: (1) where , is the th LSE's load.
ISO-NE has an almost identical load-based allocation scheme except that certain loads are excluded from the load share. All costs are allocated proportionally to the sum of real time energy buyers' pro-rata share of the real-time load obligation (RTLO) minus any real time load associated with dispatchable asset related demand (DARD) pumps [14] . Thus, for ISO-NE is the RTLO minus RTLO associated with DARD pumps.
B. MISO (Reserve Zone and Load-Based),
MISO stakeholders were in favor of including a congestion component in the cost allocation process [15] . This is achieved by considering the location of the load reduction as well as price separation in the operating reserve market clearing prices (MCP). The MISO footprint is divided into six reserve zones. These zones were created in part to identify minimum required operating reserves to meet zonal reliability requirements. When transmission constraints are present within a given zone, out-ofmerit reserves must be procured within said zone and price separation in zonal MCPs will occur. Thus, the absence of higher MCPs in a zone with dispatched demand response resources indicates that constraints in that zone are not binding. In this case, costs are allocated to real time buyers in the zone where the dispatched demand response resource is located as well as all other zones, on a pro rata basis (3) .
is the th load located in zone : (2) If the zone with dispatched demand response resources does have higher MCPs, then constraints in that zone are binding and the cost of demand response resources in that zone is only allocated to real time energy buyers in that particular zone (3):
It is important to note, that this cost allocation is only implemented when the energy price (LMP) is at or above a threshold price. If the LMP is less than the threshold, then the load is reconstituted and allocated to the host LSE [16] .
IV. PROPOSED LMP SENSITIVITY-BASED COST ALLOCATION
When binding constraints are present, an individual market participant's share of the overall market benefits is no longer simply a function of its share of the load. We therefore propose the use of LMP sensitivities to weigh the load share and thus reflect the impact of congestion on benefit distribution. Fig. 2 illustrates this method. First, the total amount to be allocated is determined. Next, a portion of this cost is allocated to each node based on LMP sensitivity. Finally, a second allocation is performed at each node to determine the costs allocated to individual LSEs at each node. This second allocation is based, in part, on the contribution of each LSE to demand response. This indirectly allows LSEs that encourage demand response to be rewarded for their efforts and also provides an additional incentive to offset lost income due to load reductions.
A. LMP Sensitivity
LMPs are determined using an optimal power flow (OPF) and reflect the price of energy at each node considering all binding transmission constraints. In [17] , Conejo et al. derive a generalized expression of LMP sensitivity, and in particular, the sensitivity of LMP with respect to demand and other parameters. This formulation involves differentiating the OPF objective function as well as the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions with respect to the optimization decision variables as well as the parameters. A description of the OPF problem is in Appendix A. Equations (4)- (7) summarize in matrix form the linear equations used to derive these sensitivities. Equations (5)- (6), make use of standard derivative notation (i.e., and ). is a matrix containing first and second derivatives of the OPF objective function, , equality constraints , and inequality constraints , with respect to the decision variables . , is a matrix containing derivatives of , and with respect to the OPF parameters :
Specific sensitivities are the following (7):
As (7) shows, this formulation can be used to calculate the sensitivity of the decision variables, dual variables, and the objective function with respect to the parameters, including demand. [17] provides the details of the above sensitivity derivation.
Equation (8) is the subset of the columns of (7) which contains the sensitivity of the LMPs, or , with respect to the parameters , , and , where is the real power demand, is the reactive power demand, and represents all the other parameters, including line parameters, voltage limits, generator capacities and generator cost coefficients: (8) For simplicity, the proposed cost allocation methodology can be performed using a DCOPF and only the sensitivity with respect to the real power, , need be considered. Equation (9) is the subset of the rows of (8) which contains the sensitivity of LMP, at any given node, to real power changes, at any given node. , is a symmetric matrix, where is the number of nodes at which an LMP is calculated. Thus each element of , or is the sensitivity of the LMP at node with respect to load changes at node , where and :
B. Nodal-Level, Sensitivity-Based Allocation Factor, Equation (10) defines a new cost allocation method based on the LMP sensitivity calculated using (9) (10) is the cost allocation factor of the market participants at the node, and is the demand reduction at node . The allocation factor of the th node thus depends not only on the load share but also on the location of the load reductions. Note that cost allocation is only necessary when .
C. Fairness Index,
In order to compare allocation methods, we define the fairness index as the variance in the benefit to cost ratios of market participants located at each node. If all market participants are allocated costs exactly proportionally to their benefits, then . Larger values of indicate that some market participants have been allocated more or less than their "fair share" of costs. Equations (11)- (14) show how this index is calculated: (11) (12) (13) (14) In Equations (11) to (13), , and are the th node's cost allocation factor, benefit and allocated cost (nodal level), respectively. is the total cost of demand response, or the sum of all the individual payments to dispatched demand response (14) where is the price for DR. And finally, and are the LMPs without and with load reduction . In order to calculate this index, two OPF solutions must be carried out to determine the actual benefit (change in price multiplied by the load) and analyze the fairness of the proposed method. However, an important feature of the proposed cost allocation method is that it allocates costs proportionally to benefits without the need for running multiple OPFs ex-post.
D. LSE-Level, Contribution-Based Allocation Factor,
Once the total cost of DR has been allocated between the nodes, it must then be divided among the buyers (LSEs) at each node. We propose that these LSE-level allocation factors be determined based on each LSE's load share, and each LSE's contribution to DR, as defined by (15): (15) Here, is the load of the th LSE at the th node. is the load reduction achieved by the th LSE at the th node, and , where is the number of LSEs at node . Thus, is the load share of the th LSE at the th node and is the demand response share of the th LSE at the th node. In (15) , the first term in the numerator reflects an individual LSE's load share, while the second term ensures a minimum cost allocation regardless of DR contribution. The term ( ) reflects the LSE's individual contribution to DR (or the lack thereof). Finally, the cost allocated to the th LSE at the th node is defined as (16) V. CASE STUDY The load-based and proposed sensitivity-based cost allocation methods were first tested on a modified version of the 6-bus test system found in [18] and illustrated in Fig. 3 . The parameters of this system are listed in Appendix B. There are three load buses. We assume that there is a single LSE at Bus 4, two LSEs at Bus 5, and three LSEs at Bus 6. We analyzed the cost allocation methods for two test cases.
For Case 1, we assume a 1% load reduction at each of the load buses in order to simply observe how the proposed cost allocation method performs. For Case 2, we consider a variety of load reduction scenarios (load reduction amount and location is randomly selected) in order to examine and compare statistical properties of the fairness index, , for both the proposed sensitivity-based cost allocation method as well as the load-based method. 
VI. RESULTS: CASE 1
A. Determine Total Cost of DR
Given the OPF solution, the total payment made to DR resources is the sum of each node's demand response multiplied by its price. Here, we assume DR is paid full LMP ( ), though this is not necessary and the price can be higher or even lower. These payments, listed in Table III , represent the total cost of DR that must be allocated.
B. Allocate the DR Cost to Each Node
Given the OPF solution, we can calculate the sensitivity matrix, . The diagonal elements represent the sensitivity of the LMP at bus to load changes at bus , while the off-diagonal entries represent the sensitivity of the LMP at bus with respect to load changes at any bus . For this test case, LMPs tend to be more sensitive to load changes at Bus 4: Based on this sensitivity matrix and using (10), we then calculate how much of the cost of load reductions should be allocated to each individual bus using (10) . Note that costs are only allocated to load buses (Bus 4, Bus 5, and Bus 6). Table IV gives the allocation factors and the allocated costs. Results of the load-based method are also presented in Table IV for comparison. Since the load is almost evenly distributed between each of the three load buses, the load-based method allocates cost almost equally. In contrast, the sensitivity-based method accounts for the fact that Bus 4 has a greater impact on LMPs, experiences the largest LMP reduction and is therefore, allocated costs proportionally to that sensitivity.
C. Allocate Nodal DR Cost to Market Buyer Level (LSE-Level)
Once the total DR cost has been allocated to each of the load busses, we then divide the cost allocated to each node among the market buyers at this node. This LSE-level cost allocation depends upon the load share of each LSE, as well as each LSE's share of the DR provided. These values are given in Table V. Since there is only one LSE at Bus 4, it accounts for 100% of the load and 100% of the load reductions. Thus, this LSE is allocated 100% of the DR cost assigned to Bus 1.
Bus 5 has two LSEs that have a roughly equal share of the load. However, LSE 2 provides a significantly larger proportion (71%) of the DR. Therefore, LSE 2 is allocated a smaller fraction of the cost. This provides an incentive to LSE 1 to encourage its customers to participate in demand response programs, and rewards LSE 2 for its above average contribution.
Bus 6 has three LSEs, two fairly large, and one fairly small. However, the smaller one (LSE 2) provides over half of the demand response. This LSE therefore is allocated a cost that reflects its size, and contribution. Although LSE 3 provides twice as much DR as LSE 1, they both have similar cost allocation factors. This is in part due to LSE 3 being slightly larger and the fact that both are penalized for providing less than their "fair 
D. Fairness Index
In order to assess the fairness of the proposed method, we calculate two OPFs (with and without demand response) to calculate exactly how much each nodal price is reduced and hence how much each node benefits. Table VII shows the change in nodal prices.
is the LMP before load reduction and is the LMP after load reductions. Although each of the load buses have similar load reductions, the price reductions, vary significantly. Bus 4 enjoys a larger price reduction than Bus 6. This is why the sensitivity-based allocation method assigns a larger portion of the cost to Bus 4 (62.3%) than Bus 6 (11.1%).
Once the actual change in LMP is determined, we then calculate the benefit of each node using (12) and the benefit to cost ratio. Using these benefit to cost ratios, we can then determine the fairness of the cost allocation method using (11) . Table VIII gives these values for both the sensitivity-based and load-based allocation methods.
These results show that the sensitivity-based cost allocation method achieves almost identical cost benefit ratios for all three nodes. This is because the sensitivity matrix appropriately accounts for the fact that Bus 4 has a greater impact on LMP and also experiences the largest LMP reduction and is therefore, allocated costs proportionally to that sensitivity.
VII. RESULTS: CASE 2 (ANALYSIS OF "FAIRNESS")
Unlike load-based allocation methods, the proposed sensitivity-based method of (10) depends on the location and magnitude of the load reductions. Thus, for a more complete analysis of fairness, we calculate the sensitivity-based allocation factors for several load reduction scenarios. In each scenario, the distribution of load reductions is randomly distributed between the three load buses. This process is repeated for increasing levels of load reduction (ranging from 1% to 7%). Fig. 4 presents a comparison of the average fairness index for sensitivity-based and load-based allocation.
For low levels of demand response (1%-3% of total load), the sensitivity-based method has an fairness index very close to zero, indicating equal distribution of costs proportional to benefits. However, as DR penetration increases, the fairness index quickly grows larger. This is because binding constraints begin to change with increasing load reductions. This inevitably has an effect on the LMP sensitivities and the linearization underlying the method becomes less accurate. However, even at large load reductions, the sensitivity-based method fairer than the load-based method.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Regardless of the price paid to demand response resources, those payments must ultimately be allocated. Because DR resources provide benefits that are enjoyed market-wide through reduced LMPs, it is not surprising that current cost allocation methods are based on each buyer's share of the total load. When there is no congestion in the network, all energy buyers benefit from price reductions proportionally to their share of the total load. However, when there is congestion, energy buyers' benefits vary by location. Some ISOs have attempted to account for this price/benefit separation during times of congestion, while others have chosen not to consider the effect of congestion explicitly.
In an attempt to improve the fairness of cost allocation and also provide an incentive to LSEs to encourage demand response, we proposed a two-step cost allocation method. First, LMP sensitivity is used to approximate the effect of congestion on LMP reductions and allocate costs down to the nodal level. Next, a method that considers load share ratio as well as DR share ratio is used to allocate the cost of DR down to the LSE-level. Finally, we analyzed the fairness of the proposed method by measuring its ability to allocate costs in proportion to the benefits. We find that for all DR penetrations considered, the sensitivity-based method results in a lower fairness index value than load-based allocation. This means that the sensitivity-based method is more effective at allocating costs in proportion to benefit.
APPENDIX A OPF FORMULATION
The OPF solution is calculated using MATPOWER software. The standard OPF equations have the following form: subject to
The objective function, , is the sum of individual generator real power cost functions and reactive power cost functions , for, , and . The equality constraints, , are the set of nonlinear real and reactive power balance equations and , respectively, where and number of buses:
The inequality constraints, , consist of apparent power flow limits for the from , and to , ends of each line:
The optimization vector contains vectors for voltage angles , voltage magnitudes , and the generators' real and reactive power outputs and , respectively. Tables IX-XI show the branch data, bus data, and generator  data, respectively.   TABLE IX  BRANCH DATA   TABLE X  BUS DATA   TABLE XI  GENERATOR DATA 
APPENDIX B 6-BUS SYSTEM PARAMETERS
